WHY ENGINEERS NEVER GET
HIRED FOR HR
James R. Fisher, Jr.,
Ph.D.
© October 31, 2019
Some years ago, I was addressing about thirty program
managers “off campus” on matters of personnel relationships and motivation. At the time, I was a management development psychologist
for Honeywell Avionics in Clearwater,
Florida: translated, an organizational development (OD) psychologist.
One of the program managers came up to me after the session,
and said, “You sure don’t sound like an HR (Human Resources) guy. You sound more like us.” I smiled.
“How do you explain that?” I
simply answered, “I’ve not always been in HR.”
In fact, HR was a new experience.
I started out as a chemist in R&D for Standard Brands, Inc., then became a
chemical sales engineer for Nalco Chemical
Company in its Industrial Division, went up the executive ladder and ended
up facilitating a new conglomerate in South Africa; went back to school to earn
a Ph.D. in industrial/organization psychology, consulted for a time, ending up working
for one of my clients, Honeywell, Inc. Eventually, I was promoted to Human Resources
Director of Planning & Development for Honeywell
Europe SA.
This eclectic experience became fodder for many of my books
and articles often critical of HR. This
is representative:
Management’s Union
While
organizations are reducing their raw numbers of people, the pesky problem of management creep still
persists. Staff engineers, administrators, and service professionals know how
to work this phenomenon.
In
1980 I saw management creep up close and personal. A Fortune 500 facility had 4,200 employees and a
complement of 250 managers, supervisors, and staff engineers. In 1989, after
several iterative reductions in personnel, the facility had 3,200 employees and
400 managers, supervisors, and staff engineers.
Over
the same period, the operation doubled in sales. In 1980, for example, HRD (Human Resources Department) had
65 employees and 7 managers. In 1989 the HRD staff had been reduced to 34
employees, but still retained its 7 managers.
Meanwhile,
most workers were asked to do the work of two or more people. HRD, the assumed
advocate of workers, was in a position to educate management on the cultural
shadings to the issue of the common
good and personhood, particularly
as it related to the changing nature of work. It was also in a position to
create a psychological climate conducive to open exchange between managers,
professionals, and other workers on the changing nature of the work
relationship.
Instead,
HRD literally became part of the problem. This was accomplished by unwittingly
becoming management’s union rather
than the employee’s advocate. By telling
management what it wanted to hear instead of what it needed to know, by failing
to report the arrogant way many professionals went about their jobs, and by
creating innocuous but costly and time-consuming cosmetic interventions, which
challenged none of management’s pet biases, HRD failed management and tuned out
professionals and most workers. What’s worse, chances are HRD will never
again be trusted with so much influence.
The
function of HRD is that of an inside-outsider. It is never that of the “yes
man.” To discharge its function effectively, HRD is a provocateur—the role of
the consultant—which is the antithesis of the consoler, the role of the
sycophant.
HRD
gravitated to what the organization didn’t need, a union for management. As a
result, it put many organizations in jeopardy, not by design, but certainly by
default. This happened at a time when the organization most urgently needed
leadership and healing. By being reactive, HRD compounded an already tenuous
situation—the need for senior management to become totally involved and
committed to change and the failure of this management to accept this role,
choosing instead to unwisely delegate it to HRD (SIX SILENT KILLERS: Management Greatest Challenge, St. Lucie Press,
1998, p. 35).
It
is why I thought DILBERT in The Tampa Bay
Times yesterday (October 30, 2019)
was especially apropos.
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